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Abstract
In the past several decades, China has established itself as a global leader in science and technol-
ogy. However, the nation's patent system is one of the youngest in the world, having only just
implemented a third amendment to its patent law in 2008. International trade concerns pressure
continuous reform of Chinese patent law and call into question the need for a fourth amendment.
This article will discuss the past, present, and future of Chinese patent law. Part I will examine
China's political and cultural history, which has long discouraged the idea of individual ownership.
Part II will provide an overview of China's current intellectual property regime as well as a brief
comparison of US and Chinese patent law after the America Invents Act. Part III will consider
whether the Chinese government should implement a fourth amendment in order to ensure an
effective Chinese patent regime.
Introduction
As one of the most rapidly developing countries in the past few decades, China has
effectively burst onto the international intellectual property scene in recent years., The
response to this burgeoning Asian power has been one of apprehension and unease, at
* Jennifer Wai-Shing Maguire is a 2012 graduate of UC Davis School of Law, where she focused on
intellectual property and patent law. She majored in Biology at Barnard College, Columbia University and
worked in oncology and protein immunology at Columbia Medical School and several biotechnology
companies. Jennifer will be entering the Navy JAG in the fall of 2012. She would like to thank Ryan Love,
Jimmy Pak, and Professor Clay Tanaka for their invaluable advice on this article.
1. See Jeff Sommer, Looking Beyond Europe, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 11, 2011, at BU6 (explaining that China is
expected to surpass the United States as the World's Largest Economy by the year 2027 because it enjoys
"largely sound government debt and deficit positions, robust trading networks and huge numbers of people
all moving steadily up the economic ladder"); Rachel T. Wu, Comment, Awaking the Sleeping Dragon: The
Evolving Chinese Patent Law and its Implications for Pharmaceutical Patents, 34 FORDIAM INT-'L L.J. 549, 549
(2011); China to Surpass the US Economy in 5 Years, RT (Apr. 26, 2011, 12:59 AM), http://rt.comi/usa/news/
imf-china-surpass-usa-five-years/ (stating that "[tlhe IMF has announced China will surpass the United States
economically in real terms in 2016-a mere five years from" the article publication date).
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least in the global intellectual property market.2 International trade concerns and China's
own interest in developing a strong intellectual property market have pressured continu-
ous reform of China's intellectual property laws in an attempt to meet the World Trade
Organization's (WTO) strict requirements. 3 But many nations argue that China's amend-
ments fall short of WVTO requirements and that China does not effectively enforce these
new regulations.4 Various member nations of the WTO believe China's undeveloped sys-
tem of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR) unfairly infringes upon global market opportu-
nities.5 In particular, the United States fears that IPR violations in China will undercut
the profitability of American technology sales abroad. 6
As nations continue to identify market loss and tangible economic harm due to IPR
infringement, global pressure on China to enforce its regulatory promises will only in-
crease.7 The United States Trade Representative (USTR) has identified China as having
one of the least developed and least effective IP regimes in the world.8 Piracy in China is
estimated to have cost IP owners $2.4 billion worldwide in 2006. 9 Furthermore, China's
copyright infringement caused an estimated $1.5 billion global loss.' 0 China's patent
docket is itself an example of the need for further IPR enforcement. Over four thousand
patent infringement cases were filed in China in 2008.11 In fact, at the time, penalties for
counterfeiting were so minimal they were viewed as business costs, creating only a negligi-
2. See Wu, supra note 1, at 549; Anna-Liisa Jacobson, The New Chinese Dynasty: How the United States and
International Intellectual Property Laws Are Failing to Protect Consumers and Investors from Counterfeiting, 7 RICH.
J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 45, 57 (2008); see generally U.S. IN-Ir'L TRADE COMM'N, INVESTIGATION No. 332-514,
USITC PUB. 4199, CHINA: INTIELLECTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENTF, INDIGENOUS INNOVATION POLI-
CIES, AND FRAMEWORKS FOR MEASURING "1lE EFFECrs ON TrHF U.S. ECONOMY (2010), available at
http://www.usitc.gov/publications/332/pub4199.pdf [hereinafter CINA: INTIELLECTIUAL PROPERTY
INFRINGEMENT]
3. See Wu, supra note 1, at 549; see also Warren Newberry, Note, Copyright Reform in China: A "TRIPS"
Much Shorter and Less Strange Than Imagined?, 35 CONN. L. REv. 1425, 1425 (2003) (explaining that China
proposed various amendments when preparing to join the WTO).
4. See Wu, supra note 1, at 549-50; see also Donald P. Harris, The Honeymoon is Over: The U.S.-China WITO
Intellectual Property Complaint, 32 FORDHAM IN-'L L.J. 96, 97 (2008) (describing that although China adopted
strong substantive IP laws, China has failed to enforce these laws); Newberry, supra note 3, at 1425 (explain-
ing that despite achieving staggering success in copyright reforn, it still has a "long way to go" in enforcing
those standards).
5. See CHINA: INTELLEcTUAL PROPERTY INFRINGEMENT, supra note 2, at 27.
6. Id.
7. See Wu, supra note 1, at 549.
8. OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2009 SPECIAL 301 REPOwr 13 (2009), available at http://www.ustr.
gov/sites/default/iles/Full /%20Version%20of%20the%202009%2OSPECAL%20301%20REPORT.pdf
(declaring that China's intellectual property rights enforcement regime remains ineffective); Kimberly N. Van
Voorhis & Christie Yang, Recent Developments in Patent Law Worldwide, 997 PL/PAT 405, 408 (2010) (stating
that the "USTR's Priority Watch List" includes China as having one of the least developed regimes).
9. See Harris, supra note 4, at 102; INT'L INrTELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, ILPA 2008 "SPECIAL 301"
RECOMMENDATIONS, 2006 AND 2007 EsmnArEO TRADE LOSSES DUE TO COPYuGrr PIRACY app. A
(2008), available at www.iipa.com/pdf/2008SPEC301LOSSLEVEL.pdf (explaining that the estimated losses
due to Chinese piracy was $2.4 billion U.S. between 2006 and 2007).
10. Dexter Roberts, The Plague of Chinese Piracy, Bus. WK., June 5, 2000, at 44, available at http://www.
businessweek.com/2000/00-23/b3684007.htm; IN'T'L. INrELLECTUAL PROP. ALLIANCE, IIPA 2002 "SPE-
CIAL 301" RECOMMENDATlIONS, IIPA 2000-2001 ESTLMATED TRADE LOSSES DUE TO CoPYRIGr PIRACY
1 (2002), available at http://www.iipa.com/pdf/2002_Febl4__LOSSES.pdf (estimating total U.S. trade losses
for 2001 due to copyright piracy in China at just over $1.5 billion).
11. Van Voorhis & Yang, supra note 8, at 408.
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ble deterrence.' 2 International patent holders face the additional risk of patent invalida-
tion by petition of local Chinese pharmaceutical companies, as was the case with Pfizer's
Viagra patent.' 3 Thus, the ineffective enforcement of international IPRs in China has
frustrated international litigants. 14
Despite these fears, China's IP system is undeniably in its infancy and is therefore capa-
ble of developing an effective patent system in the near future. 15 With the most recent
third amendment to China's patent law, the country has taken a substantial step toward
meeting the WTFO requirements and appeasing other developed nations.' 6 As a response
to continued complaints of an ineffective intellectual property regime, China amended its
patent law for a third time in 2008.17 With increased monetary damages for infringers
and additional administrative and judicial tools to better enforce patents, the Third
Amendment is predicted to address many international concerns regarding China's IP
system.' 8 Whether this latest modification will suffice has yet to be seen.
Part I of this article discusses China's recent history and the political atmosphere lead-
ing up to the Third Amendment. Part I1 discusses the sufficiency of China's Third
Amendment. Finally, Part Ell discusses the future of intellectual property rights in China
and the need for further reform.
I. Past: 2000 Years of Political and Cultural Adversity to Intellectual
Property Rights
Historically, China was not particularly receptive to the idea that intellectual property
was a form of individual property that should be legally protected. 19 But the government
recognized that an established intellectual property regime was necessary to legitimize
itself as a global leader.20 As this article examines the commencement of a Chinese intel-
lectual property system and its subsequent amendments, it is important to understand the
complex history of politics and culture that laid the groundwork for these changes. The
Confucian, Taoist, and Communist historical background of China created an environ-
12. Evelyn Iritani, China Pressed over Piracy, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2005, at CI, available at http://articles.la
times.com/2005/oct/27/business/fi-piracy27 (explaining that "penalties are often 'so light they just amount to
a cost of doing business for those who infringe"').
13. Richard A. Castellano, Patent Law for New Medical Uses of Known Compounds and Pfizer's Viagra Patent,
46 IDEA 283, 311-12 (discussing how Chinese pharmaceutical companies tried to get Pfizer's Viagra patent
invalidated).
14. Harris, supra note 4, at 114-15 (stating that the United States filed a VVTO complaint against China for
IPR Infringement).
15. See Wu, supra note 1, at 551-52 (describing China's Third Amendment and potential for strengthened
IPRs).
16. Id.
17. Wei-Ning Yang & Andrew Y. Yen, The Dragon Gets New IP Claws: The Latest Amendments to the Chinese
Patent Law, INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J., Mar. 2009, at 2.
18. See generally The Third Amendment to Patent Law to Increase the Strength of Patent Protection on Six Mea-
sures, GUIZHOU PROVINCE INTELL. PROP. BUREAU (2009), http://www.gzsipo.gov.cn/ywdt/display.asp?id=
784 [hereinafter Patent Protection on Six Measures].
19. See Alexander C. Chen, Climbing the Great Wall: A Guide to Intellectual Property Enforcement in the Peo-
ple's Republic of China, 25 AIPLA QJ. 1, 9-10 (1997) (explaining that China's adherence to Confucianism and
Taoism thwarted the development of an IP system).
20. Id. at 12
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ment unfriendly to the development of intellectual property rights. Chinese political cul-
ture further frustrated the development of IPRs when Communism gained control of the
country.21 In recent decades, China has made significant improvements to its IP system.22
However, the WTO and its member nations agree that the country still has a long way to
go in enforcing its new IP laws.
2 3
A. INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS VERSUS "THE WAY" OF TAoisM AND
CONFUCIANISM
China's under-developed IP regime is, in part, the result of a Confucian and Taoist
emphasis on sharing property and discouragement of individualism (The Way).24 For two
thousand years, China encouraged its citizens to share inventions, discoveries, and creative
works. 25 The sole reward for successful intellectual achievements was public recognition
and endowments from the King or Emperor.26 As Alexander Chen stated, "[1]earning was
not an individual pursuit, it was a community goal."27 Taoism promoted harmony, bal-
ance, and social totality. 28 Confucianism eschewed the idea of personal gain at the ex-
pense of others. 29 Together, both Confucianism and Taosim embodied a way of life for
most Chinese people.30
This way of life was reflected in almost every aspect of Chinese society. Traditionally,
copying was a legitimate method of learning in China.3 1 Students of sculpture, painting,
and calligraphy honored their master by copying his style and work closely.32 The more
people who admired a master's work, the more it was copied and spread, increasing the
master's success and popularity. 33 The national acceptance of copying combined with a
tradition of isolationism and distrust of outsiders34 further discouraged any development
of internationally recognized IPRs. 35
21. See Wu, supra note 1, at 553.
22. Id. at 554.
23. Id. at 549.
24. Id. at 553; Raymond M. Gabriel, Comment, The Patent Revolution: Proposed R forms in Chinese Intellectual
Property Law, Policy, and Practice Are the Latest Step to Bolster Patent Protection in China, 9 ASIAN-PAC. L. &
POL'YJ. 323, 325-26 (2008) (stating that IP is "alien to Chinese culture," which is focused on Confucianism
and the importance of communal success).
25. See Chen, srpra note 19, at 8-9.
26. Id.
27. Id. at 8.
28. Id.; Philip H. Lam, Copyright Protection of Foreign Computer Software in the People's Republic of China:
Significant Progress in Two Years, 17 Loy. L.A. IN'"L & COMp. L. RFv. 861, 867 (1995).
29. Chen, supra note 19, at 9-10.
30. Id. at 10.
31. Arthur Wineburg, Op-Ed., Crying the Blues: Why the U.S. Shouldn't Expect China to Honor Intellectual
Property Rights Agreements, CFR. TRIB., Mar. 23, 1995, at 19.
32. Chen, supra note 19, at 10.
33. Id.
34. Id. (explaining that a distrust of outsiders was largely due to the manipulation of the Chinese people in
the Opium War in 1840).
35. See id.
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Despite having a religious and cultural background that discouraged IPRs, China began
to recognize such rights around the turn of the 20th century.36 In 1898, China imple-
mented its first patent act, the Reward Regulations for Promoting Technology Develop-
ment (Zhengxing Gongyi Geijiang Zhangcheng). 37 In 1903, China signed its first bi-
lateral patent treaty with the United States, constituting "the most important convention
made by the United States with any oriental country." 38 The Treaty accomplished two
major goals: (1) "the extension of the United States international copyright laws to
China," and (2) "the promise from China to establish a patent office in which the inven-
tions of citizens of the United States may be protected." 39 In 1910, the Chinese emperor
enacted the first written national statute on copyrights.40 In this manner, IPRs slowly
gained momentum in China.
B. THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION AND THE COMMUNIST REGIME
Despite a trend of strengthening IPRs and international IP treaties in China, progress
in China's intellectual property regime came to a halt with the onset of communism. 41
Between 1945 and 1949, the Communist Party combated the Nationalist Party for control
of the political system.42 Even decades before 1949, communists controlled areas around
the country, influencing politics and culture to create "Soviet-like" microcosms.43 There-
fore, when the Communist Party gained control in 1949, a strong sense of the communist
ideology had already spread throughout the nation.44 Communist policies promoted shar-
ing property and discouraged individual ownership. 45 Commentators have noted that the
communist principles of shared property flowed seamlessly from China's Confucian and
Taoist background, providing an easy transition.46
China adopted a two-track approach toward patents, imitating the approach taken by
the Soviet Union.47 The "first track" discouraged individual property ownership in an
invention by awarding only a "certificate of invention."48 The certificate was essentially
meaningless to the holder because it attributed ownership and rights to the government,
36. Liwei Wang, The Chinese Traditions Inimical to the Patent Law, 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 15, 18-20
(1993).
37. Id. at 19.
38. Justin McCabe, Enforcing Intellectual Property Rights: A Methodology for Understanding the Enforcement
Problem in China, 8 PIERCE L. REv. 1, 13 (2009).
39. Id. at 13 (quoting Treaty with China Ratified, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 1903, at 1) (noting that although the
Treaty of 1903 signified China's recognition of IPRs, the treaty was patently unfair as it provided protection
only to American citizens)).
40. 1 INTERNATIONAL COPYRIGHIT- LAW AND PRACTICE CM § 11] (Melville B. Nimmer & Paul Edward
Geller eds.) (1995).
41. Chen, supra note 19, at 11.
42. McCabe, supra note 38, at 15.
43. Id. (quoting John R. Allison & Lianlian Lin, The Evolution of Chinese Attitudes Toward Property Rights in
Invention and Discovery, 20 U. PA. J. L]'r'L ECON. L. 735, 749 (1999)).
44. See McCabe, supra note 38, at 15.
45. See generally Allison & Lin, supra note 43, at 736, 743-44.
46. See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, To STEAL A BOOK is AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 2 (1995).
47. Allison & Lin, supra note 43, at 749.
48. Id. at 749-50; see McCabe, supra note 38, at 15-16.
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including the right to disseminate and collect royalties from the invention.49 The "second
track" of Chinese patent law at this time issued a true patent to the inventor, including the
right to receive royalties. 50 Qualifying for this type of patent was not only difficult, but the
government had the right to confiscate the invention at any time if the product concerned
"national security," or "affected the welfare of the great majority of people."15  As a result,
by 1963 property rights in patents were essentially abolished.5 2
In the decades following the establishment of a communist regime in China, further
cultural movements halted the IP system almost entirely.S3 During the period from 1966-
1976, Chairman Mao instigated the Cultural Revolution to prevent the formation of the
bureaucratic communism that had developed in the Soviet Union.54 The movement led
to the imprisonment of writers, scientists, doctors, and many other intellectuals in an at-
tempt to eradicate individualism.5 5 For the next decade, China lacked an IP system en-
tirely due to the renunciation of all previously established patent laws. 56 In 1969,
Chairman Mao declared an official end to the Cultural Revolution, but the movement
continued to be active until the death of military leader Lin Biao in 1971.5 7
C. DENG XIAOPING AND THE REBIRTH OF CHINA'S IP SYSTEM
A period of aggressive cultural and political reform began when Deng Xiaoping came
into power.5 s He recognized that foreign investment was essential to China's future and
that the implementation of an IP regime was necessary to attract international busiless.5 9
Consequently, in 1979, China began drafting patent laws to improve IPRs,60 and in 1980,
China joined the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO). 61 In 1984, China
enacted its first patent law in decades, listing the methods for patent application, the pat-
ent examination process, and the protection strength of effective patents.62 But the 1984
patent law lacked essential features. For example, the law excluded patents for inventions
49. Allison & Lin, supra note 43, at 750.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. PETER GAN-EA & THOMAS PATTLOCH, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINA 3 (Christopher
Heath ed., 2005); Wu, supra note 1, at 553-54.
53. LouIsE CHIPLEY SLAVICEK, MILESTONES 5N MODERN WORLD HIsTORY: THE CHINESE CULTURAL
REVOLUTION 8-11 (2010).
54. Id.; Wu, supra note 1, at 553.
55. Wu, supra note 1, at 554.
56. Id.
57. See generally Thayer Watkins, The Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution in China, 1966-1976, SAN JOSE
ST. U., http://www.sjsu.edu/faculty/watkins/cultrev.htm (last visited Apr. 24, 2012).
58. Gabriel, supra note 24, at 328 (stating that "[w]hen Deng Xiaoping resumed power.., the Chinese
government began an ambitious program of economic and legal reform").
59. Id. at 328-29 (explaining that Deng Xiaoping believed a national patent system would attract overseas
investment).
60. China's IP Journey, WORLD INTTELL. PROP. ORG. (Dec. 2010), http://www.wipo.int/wipo-magazine/en/
20 10 /06/article_0010.html.
61. See McCabe, supra note 38, at 17.
62. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa () v j j J) [Patent Law of the People's Re-
public of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, effective Apr. 1,
1985) arts. 26-44, 59-66 (China), available at http://english.sipo.gov.cn/laws/lawsregulations/201101/t201101
19_566244.html (last visited Aug. 22, 2012) [hereinafter 1984 Patent Law).
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that involved food, pharmaceuticals, and beverages. 63 Although the law was later
amended in 1992 to cover pharmaceutical patents, it still offered little protection. 64 The
second and third amendments were adopted in 2001 and 2008 in an attempt to expand the
intellectual property regime.65
In the most recent decades, China has made continuous efforts to expand its intellectual
property system.66 But local governments have hindered these efforts because of their
increasing autonomy and power.67 In an effort to gain recognition in the global arena and
strengthen its intellectual property regime, China joined the WTO in 2001. 68 Upon
China's acceptance into the WTO, member states demanded that China assume more
obligations than other member states due to its under-developed IP system. 69 Member
states further argued over China's status as a developing country.70 Developing countries
were afforded more benefits and flexibility than developed countries in the WTO.71
China was ultimately classified as a developed country for the purposes of IP laws, as it
was the third largest trading nation and received more foreign investment than any other
country.72 Thus, China was forced to agree to implement patent provisions that met the
requirements of Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS).73 Instead
of the five-year grace period that was afforded to developing countries, the WTO re-
quired China to immediately implement IP laws that would meet the minimum require-
ments of TRIPS.74 The nation has largely complied with the provisions of TRIPS by
enacting laws that meet the minimum requirements,75 but other nations within the WTO
have criticized China for ineffectively enforcing these new laws. 76
I. Present: China's Current IP Regime
With its most recent IP laws and amendments, China has come a long way from the
political and cultural history that strongly discouraged individual ownership. But its pat-
ent law system today contains two of the same flaws that caused China's two previous
attempts to fail: (1) the fact that IP laws were not voluntarily implemented in China, but
rather were encouraged or required by Western countries; and (2) the significant amount
63. Id. art. 25(4)-(5).
64. Wu, supra note 1, at 553.
65. Id. at 553.
66. Id. at 555.
67. Jessica C. Wong, Note, The Challenges Multinational Corporations Face in Protecting Their Well-Known
Trademarksin China, 31 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 937, 937-38, 964-76 (2006) (asserting that national protection of
local governments, lack of judicial independence and enforcement, and inadequate punishment led to weak
enforcement of IPRs).
68. See Gabriel, supra note 24, at 1008.
69. See Wu, supra note 1, at 556.
70. Harris, supra note 4, at 110-11.
71. Id. at 109-11.
72. Id. at 111; Wu, spra note 1, at 556.
73. Cynthia Smith, Note, A Practical Guide to Chinese Patent Law, 29 SETON HALL LEGSS. J. 643, 644-45
(2005).
74. See Protocol on the Accession of the People's Republic of China, pt. I, T (2)(A), Nov. 23, 2001, WT/L/
432; Harris, supra note 4, at 112.
75. Smith, supra note 73, at 645; see Brigitte Binkert, Comment, Why the Current Global Intellectual Property
Framework Under TRIPS is Not Working, 10 INTELL. PROP. L. BULL. 143, 149 (2006).
76. Smith, supra note 73, at 645.
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of control China retains over issued patents, resulting in a decreased sense of ownership
and a reduced incentive to invent. 77 These two qualities were exhibited in both the Treaty
of 1903 and Regulations of the 1950s. 78 This pattern might signal that, despite China's
best intentions, Chinese IP law has not laid a foundation capable of change. 79
A. THE THREE AMENDMENTS TO CHINESE PATENT LAW SINCE 1984
Since its first patent law was enacted in 1984, China has amended its patent law three
times over the past two decades.80 In 1992, Chinese patent law was amended to expand
patentable subject matter to include pharmaceuticals as well as to extend the patent length
from fifteen to twenty years.81 In 2000, China amended its patent law for the second time,
in anticipation of accession to the WTO.82 The second amendment strengthened patent
protection and enforcement and attempted to assist foreign countries and individuals to
file patents in China. 83 The second amendment was ultimately unclear in its terms, result-
ing in a large amount of bad faith applicants who filed for patents of prior arts and imme-
diately accused others of infringing on their patents. 84 Due to these deficiencies, China
again amended its patent law for a third time in 2008.85
China's Third Amendment signaled new hope for a sufficient national patent regime.
On June 5, 2008, China's State Council issued the National Intellectual Property Strategy
Outline, which set a goal of improved creation, utilization, protection, and administration
by 2020.86 This led to the finalization of the Third Amendment in December of 2008,
which increased monetary damages against infringers and provided additional administra-
tive and judicial tools to better enforce IPRs.8 7
The Third Amendment also clarified that two types of patent law violations are illegal:
(1) acts of "passing off" patents and (2) patent infringement.88 "Passing off" occurs when
77. McCabe, supra note 38, at 15.
78. ld.; Allison & Lin, supra note 43, at 749-50 (explaining how the intermittent regulations in the 1950s
provided little patent protection and significant government control).
79. McCabe, supra note 38, at 15.
80. Wu, supra, note 1, at 574.
81. Gao Xia-yun, Comment, An Introduction to Administrative Protection for Pharmaceuticals, 9 DuKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 259, 259 (1998) (stating that in 1992 administrative protection for pharmaceutical prod-
ucts was provided); Yang & Yen, supra note 17, at 18 (mentioning that the 1992 amendment allowed
pharmaceuticals to fall under patentable subject matter).
82. See Jiwen Chen, Better Patent Law for International Commitment-The Amendment of Chinese Patent Law,
I RICH. J. GLOBAL L. & Bus. 61, 61 (2001).
83. Id. at 67-69.
84. Xiaoqing Feng, The Interaction Between Enhancing the Capacity for Independent Innovation and Patent Pro-
tection: A Perspective on the Third Amendment to the Patent Law of the P.R. China, 9 U. Prrr. J. TECI. L. &
POL'Y 1, 126-27 (2009) ("[S]ome illegal actors will make use of [the patent system] to apply for patent for the
knowingly prior art or design, and immediately accuse others of infringing upon his patent rights after he has
obtained patent right.").
85. Wu, supra note 1, at 575.
86. Outline of the National Intellectual Property Strategy, GOV.cN (June 21, 2008), http://english.gov.cn/
2008-06/2 1/content 1023471.htm.
87. Patent Protection on Six Measures, supra note 18.
88. Id.
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an individual deceptively portrays that an unpatented invention is patented.S9 This in-
cludes manufacturing a product with a patent marking, continuing to manufacture a prod-
uct with an invalidated patent, advertising unpatented technology as patented technology,
and forging any patent certificate, document, or application. 90 The Third Amendment
increased the civil fines for "passing off."9 1 In addition to confiscating the profit earned
on a product that has been "passed off," the Patent Administrative Department may im-
pose a fine four times the illegal income and three times the illegal earnings.92 Further-
more, the Third Amendment provided more resources to investigate "passing off' patents
in an attempt to reduce their overall occurrence. 93
The Third Amendment further mandated that compensation for patent infringement
be based on the actual losses of the patentee or the profit made by the infringer. 94 To
clearly define infringement, the amendment added three paragraphs to article 2 which
clarified the meaning of "design," "invention," and "utility."95
Despite these harsher penalties, the Third Amendment also made it harder for paten-
tees to obtain patents and easier for infringers to assert defenses. 96 Article 22 was
amended to adopt the "absolute novelty" national standard. 97 This heightened novelty
standard increased the requirements for obtaining a patent. On the other hand, the Third
Amendment also expanded non-infringement defenses by codifying the prior art defense,
thereby permitting a defendant to argue that the invention or design was revealed by prior
art. 98
These changes to China's patent system have stirred national optimism and encouraged
market growth in the patent area. But many argue that despite an improved legal system,
China has failed to ensure that these regulations are enforced at the local level.99
• 89. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa ( [Patent Law of the People's
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Mar. 12, 1984, 3d amend.
Dec. 27, 2008, effective Oct. 1, 2009) art. 69, available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/details.jsp?id=5484
[hereinafter 2008 Patent Law]; Wu, supra note 1, at 576.
90. See 2008 Patent Law, supra note 89, art. 69; see THE PEOPLE'S GOVERNMENT OF HE.'tAN. PROVINCE,
ADmsNISTRATivE GUIDANCE ISSUED REGARDING THE PUNISHMENT FOR PASSING OFF PATENTI'S AND
PASSING OFF PRODucrS OR PROCESSES 1 (2007), available at http://www.henan.gov.cn/bsfw/system/2007/
09/06/010040254.shtml; Wu, supra note 1, at 576.
91. 2008 Patent Law, supra note 89, art. 3.
92. Wu, supra note 1, at 576.
93. Id. at 577.
94. 2008 Patent Law, supra note 89, art. 65.
95. Id. art. 2.
96. See Wu, supra note 1, at 578-80.
97. 2008 Patent Law, supra note 89, art. 22 ("Novelty means that the invention or utility model concerned
is not an existing technology; no patent application is filed by any unit or individual for any identical inven-
tion or utility model with the patent administration department under the State Council before the date of
application for patent right, and no identical invention or utility model is recorded in the patent application
documents or the patent documentations which are published or announced after the date of application.").
98. Id. art. 62.
99. See Andrew Evans, Note, Taming the Counterfeit Dragon: The WTO, TRIPS and Chinese Amendments to
Intellecntal Property Laws, 31 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 587, 590-91 (2003) (explaining that under-funded local
governments are left to enforce China's new patent laws).
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B. THE ESSENTIAL PROBLEM WITH THE CURRENT IP SYSTEM: ENFORCEMENT
Although China's recently introduced patent reform initially sparked high hopes, time
has shown that the country has fallen far behind in enforcement mechanisms. 00 China
relies on administrative or adjudicative mechanisms to enforce IP laws in both the crimi-
nal and civil context. 01  But these mechanisms are often ineffective against
infringement.102
Administrative relief is often used to handle pharmaceutical patent infringement
cases.103 China's State Intellectual Property Office (SIPO) handles the granting and en-
forcement of patents.104 SIPO's enforcement mechanisms include investigation, media-
tion, imposition of fines, "[a]nd providing cease-and-desist orders through provisional
offices and agencies." 105 Patent holders may file a request for an administrative investiga-
tion into infringement at a local SIPO office. 10 6 If the local SIPO office agrees with the
filer and finds for infringement, the patent administrative authority may order the in-
fringer to immediately terminate his or her actions. 10 7 The infringer has fifteen days to
file an appeal in court. 0 Starting when the patentee becomes aware of an infringement, a
patent holder has two years to file a patent infringement suit before the statute of limita-
tions bars such action. 109 If the patentee files suit within this two-year period and the
infringement is deemed to be criminal, a criminal investigation of the infringer will also
ensue.110
Although SIPO has broad power to enforce equitable remedies, the office more often
merely issues monetary penalties that are insufficient to discourage infringers from repeat
violations."' SIPO has the power to enjoin the infringer from continuing to manufac-
ture, to order the destruction of infringing products, and to confiscate machinery used to
make infringing products. 112 However, infringers often receive only a monetary penalty,
which is not distributed to patentees, but kept by the government. 113
100. Wu, supra note 1, at 557.
101. Dina Bronshtein, Comment, Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals in China: Could Changes Bring Stronger Protec-
tion for Intellectual Property Rights and Human Health?, 17 PAc. RIM. L. & POL'Y J. 439, 452 (2008).
102. Id. at 452, 455-56.
103. Id. at 452, 454.
104. Id. at 453.
105. Wu, supra note 1, at 557.
106. Intellectual Property Rights, U.S. EMBASSY: BEIJING, CHINA, http://beijing.usembassy-china.org.cn/ipr
patent.html (last visited Oct. 17, 2012).
107. See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa [ IPatent Law of the People's
Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., 2d amend. Aug. 25, 2000,
effective July 1, 2001) art. 57 (China) [hereinafter 2000 Patent Law].
108. Id. (explaining that if the party concerned is not satisfied with the decision, he or it may, within fifteen
days from the receipt of the notification of the order, institute legal proceedings in the people's court accord-
ing to the Administrative Procedure Law of the People's Republic of China).
109. Id. art. 62.
110. Id. art. 58 (explaining that where the infringement constitutes a crime, the party shall be prosecuted for
his criminal liability).
111. See Bronshtein, supra note 101, at 455-56.
112. Id. at 453-54.
113. Id.
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The SIPO office itself lacks the financial means, and therefore the motivation, to im-
prove enforcement methods and train staff. 114 Because the counterfeiting business may be
a significant portion of the local economy, local governments may be hesitant to provide
more financing to SIPO offices despite the fact the SIPO offices receive no outside fund-
ing." 5 Consequently, staff is insufficiently trained to enforce cease-and-desist orders, and
little incentive is provided by the local community to do so." 6 Infringement cases are
often not sent to criminal authorities because doing so would disrupt the local
economy. 117
Because of these difficulties and because of the overwhelming complexity of patent in-
fringement cases, adjudicative relief is more often sought by patentees.1s China's judicial
system consists of four levels. 119 First, the Basic People's Court handles the first instance
of cases at a local level.'12 Second, the Intermediate People's Court handles relevant im-
portant local cases in the first instance and hears appeals from the Basic People's Court.
121 Third, the Higher People's Court is the highest local court in China, and its jurisdic-
tion corresponds with the province or large city in which it is located.' 22 The Supreme
People's Court is the highest court in the mainland area of China (excluding Hong Kong
and Macau). 123
In these courts, the method used for determining whether infringement has occurred is
simple.124 Chinese courts have not yet developed effective methods for determining in-
fringement and cannot use case law to guide future cases.' 25 Additionally, plaintiffs must
gather and present "their own evidence to meet" the burden of proof.126 Chinese courts
only permit evidence "in its original form" 27 and only sometimes allow evidence from
certain previous court proceedings. 128 If evidence originates from outside of China, it
"must be notarized in the originating country" and" authenticated by the Chinese embassy
114. See id. at 454.
115. Evans, supra note 99, at 591 (explaining that local governments are often reluctant to provide funding
for administrative agencies' operations because they benefit financially from the piracy).
116. Id.
117. See id.
118. Intellectual Property Rights, supra note 106 (stating in relevant part that "[p]atent disputes remain the
most likely of intellectual property right disputes to be adjudicated, due in large part of their relative
complexity").
119. J. Benjamin Bai, Peter J. Wang & Helen Chang, What Multinational Companies Need to Know About
Patent Invalidation and Patent Litigation in China, 5 Nw. J. INT'L TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 449, 457 (2007).
120. Id.
121. Id. at 457-58.
122. Id. at 457.
123. Id.
124. See Benjamin Bai, Peter Wang & Tony Chen, How to Litigate Patents in China, MANAGING IN-tELL.
PROP. (Apr. 1, 2007), http://www.managingip.com/IssueArticle/1329560/Supplements/How-to-litigate-pat-
ents-in-China.html?supplementListd=59057.
125. Id.; see also Laurie Self & Jason Ma, Amending China's Trademark Law: A Discussion of the Possible Changes
to Trademark Law in China, 218 TRADEmARK WORLD 18, 20 (2009) (noting that there is no stare decisis in
China and that case law is not binding on lower courts).
126. Bai, Wang & Chen, supra note 124, at 4.
127. Wu, supra note 1, at 560.
128. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Minshi Susong Fa ( [Civil Procedure
Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., Oct. 28, 2007, effective Apr. 9, 1991) art.
68 (China).
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or consulate.' 29 For these reasons, the analysis portion of a trial may last for several
days. 13
0
Furthermore, monetary penalties that courts actually impose for patent infringement
are an insufficient deterrent.' 3' Before the third amendment to Chinese patent law, the
maximum for civil penalties was set at 500,000 Yuan, or about $62,500.132 But the number
of patent infringement cases has continuously risen in China, 133 and the maximum fine
today is three times the infringer's income, which includes calculations of the infringer's
profit and the patentee's losses.1 34 Despite this heightened ceiling, actual fines imposed
average less than $800.135 Thus, what seems to be an effective penalty regulation is, in
reality, not much of a deterrent.
In the criminal context, China's IP system is also lacking.136 Chinese law suggests crim-
inal prosecution only if "the circumstances are serious." 137 Such ambiguous statutory lan-
guage allows for broad interpretation and generally results in overlooking infringement. 13
In fact, local governments often pressure judges to utilize this broad discretion to ignore
patent infringement cases before them. 139 When a criminal prosecution is actually suc-
cessful, the system allows for a three-year maximum sentence if "the circumstances are
serious" and a seven-year maximum sentence if "the infringement is of 'a more serious
nature."1 40 Once again, this broad statutory language leaves significant ambiguity and
129. Wu, supra note 1, at 560.
130. Bai, Wang & Chen, supra note 124, at 6 (stating that "[cilaim construction and infringement analysis
occur at trial, which might last between half a day and a couple of days").
131. Jiang Zhipei, Suggestions on Copyright Law Amendment, CHINA IP MAG. (Aug. 18, 2011), http://www.
chinaipmagazine.com/en/journal-show.asp?id=725; see also Wu, supra note 1, at 587-88.
132. Id.
133. Id. (stating that the number of IP infringement civil cases has increased from 5200 in 2001 to 7800 in
2002).
134. 2000 Patent Law, supra note 107, art. 58.
135. CONG. ExEc. COMM'N ON CHINA, 109th Cong., 1st Sess., No. 21-813, at 5 (Daniel C.K. Chow re-
porting that the average fine was $794 in 2000), available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/roundtables/051605/
21813.pdf [hereinafter Chow].
136. U.S. Trade with China: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Trade of the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, l10th
Cong. 13 (2007) (statement of Geralyn Ritter, Senior Vice President of International Affairs, Pharmaceutical
Research and Manufacturers Association) (commenting that patent infringement cases often are not tried for
criminal liability, which results in very few criminal sanctions); see also Wu, supra note 1, at 563 ("In 2002, the
courts had convicted infringers in less than one percent of the counterfeiting cases that administrative agen-
cies had handled.").
137. 2000 Patent Law, supra note 107, art. 66.
138. See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REP., 2006 SPECIAL 301 REPORT 19 (2006), available at http://www.
ustr.gov/archive/assets/Document -Library/Reports-Publications/2006/2006-Specia-30 -Review/asset-up
load file473_9336.pdf ("China has thus maintained a legal 'safe harbor' that protects a large group of com-
mercial infringers and operates to deprive the criminal enforcement authorities of needed information re-
garding the sources of counterfeit and pirated goods.").
139. Id.; Wu, supra note 1, at 563.
140. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xing Fa ( [Criminal Law of the People's Repub-
lic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat'l People's Cong., July 1, 1979, amend. Mar. 14, 1997,
effective Oct. 1, 1997) 1979 STANDING Comm. NAT'L PEOPLE'S CONG. GAz. 83, arts. 215-216 (China); Wu,
supra note 1, at 563-64.
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permits courts to exercise minimum enforcement penalties.141 Furthermore, local legisla-
tures may enact their own IP laws, resulting in inconsistent IPRs across China.
14 2
C. A COMPARISON OF AMERICAN AND CHIESE PATENT LAW
In addition to the U.S. concern that China's enforcement mechanisms are lacking, ma-
jor differences between American and Chinese patent law have furthered tension and dis-
trust between the two countries. 14 3 These differences previously included defenses to
infringement, patent priority, prior use rights, grace periods, and best-mode require-
ments. 144 But two of these differences disappeared with the Leah Smith America Invents
Act (AIA), the most significant change to U.S. patent law in decades. 14 5
1. The America Invents Act Eliminates Two Previous Differences between Chinese and
American Patent Law: Patent Priority and Prior Use Rights
President Barack Obama signed the AlA into law on September 16, 2011, thus eliminat-
ing two major differences between Chinese and American patent law that previously ex-
isted: (1) patent priority and (2) prior use rights. 46 Although the new language has yet to
be interpreted by courts, the ALA might actually soothe some of the tension between
China and the United States that erupted from differing patent systems.
Most significantly, the AIA switched the U.S. patent system from "first to invent" to
"first to file."' 47 Thus, America's patent priority laws now comport with China as well as
most other countries around the world, moving it toward the international standard. 14 8
This change will also greatly reduce patent litigation in the United States through the
implementation of post-grant review proceedings.
14 9
141. Wu, supra note 1, at 563.
142. Jessica Jiong Zhou, Note, Trademark Law & Enforcement in China: A Transnational Perspective, 20 Wis.
INT'L L.J. 415, 435-36 (2002) (explaining that a decentralized government in China has led to confusion
among local governments in enforcement).
143. See Wu, supra note 1, at 561-62.
144. Ryan M. Corbett, Note, Harmonization of U.S. and Foreign Patent Law and H.R. 2795: The Patent Reform
Act of2005, 18 FLA. J. INT'L L. 717, 718-19 (2006) (claiming that there are five major differences between
U.S. and Foreign patent law); WENDY H. SCHAcHTF & JOHN R. THOMAS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PUB.
RL 32996, PATENrT REFORMS: INNOVA'fON ISSUES 8 (2005) (explaining several notable distinctions between
the US patent law and other countries).
145. David Kappos, Under Sec'y of Commerce for IP & Dir. of the USPTO, Remarks as Prepared for
Delivery at the 3rd Annual Georgetown Law and Stanford Law Conference: The America Invents Act: A
Patent Law Game-Changer (Nov. 4, 2011), available at http://www.uspto.gov/news/speeches/2011/kappos.
georgetown.jsp.
146. Id.; compare Wu, supra note 1, at 563, with Corbett, sutpra note 144, at 718-19.
147. Wendell Ray Guffey & Kimberly Shreiber, America Invents Act - The Switch to a First-to-File Patent
System, 68 J. Mo. B. 156, 156 (2012), available at http://www.mobar.org/uploadedFiles/Home/Publications/
Joumal/2012/05-06/invents-act.pdf.
148. See SCIIAC-rT & THOMAS, supra note 144, at 8.
149. Brian Higgins, ALA Goal Reduce Patent Litigation, MD. IN-FELL. PROP. L. BLOC (Oct. 16, 2011), http://
www.marylandiplaw.com/2011/10/articles/ip-news-and-trends/aia-goal-reduce-patent-litigation! ("The new
procedures are expected to change the standard for instituting reexaminations and reviews, time limits, bur-
dens of proof, and how discovery is taken.").
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Secondly, the AlA also brought prior use rights into the American patent arena, a de-
fense inherent in a first-to-file system.' 50 Previously, the American Patent Act employed a
narrow prior use defense limited to infringement claims of business methods.151 The new
statute greatly expands the prior use defense to include any good-faith commercial uses,
arm's length sales, and commercial transfers that occurred at least one year before the
earlier of either (1) the effective filing date of the patent application or (2) the inventor's
public disclosure that is an exception to prior art under the AIA's limited grace period. 152
Despite these recent legislative changes that bring China and the United States closer
into alignment, many significant differences in IP still exist between the two countries. 5 3
The following sections will explore three of the most significant differences: infringement
defenses, grace periods, and the best-mode requirement.
2. Defenses to Infiingement in China and the United States
First, China provides defenses to infringement that are not available in the United
States. 154 The United States provides few specific defenses to infringement. 155 Judicially
created defenses include experimental use,156 inequitable conduct, 5 7 and patent misuse.158
U.S. courts have generally justified these defenses on public policy grounds. 159 In addi-
tion, 35 U.S.C. §§ 273 and 282 provide statutory defenses to infringement.160 Section
282 lists the most commonly used defenses to infringement that permit argument as to the
validity of the patent. 161 This type of argument depends on establishing bars to patenta-
bility, such as a finding of prior public use, 162 obviousness of the invention, 16 3 prior art,164
150. Id.; America Invents Act: Prior Use Defense, InventiveStep, http://invennvestep.net/2011/09/2 1/america-
invents-act-prior-use-defense/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2012).
151. American Invents Act: Prior Use Defense, spra note 150.
152. 35 U.S.C. § 273 (2006).
153. See supra section II(C) (stating that the major differences between the United States and China are
definitions of infringement, grace periods, and prior user rights); see also Chow, supra note 135.
154. McCabe, supra note 38, at 21.
155. Id.
156. ROBERT P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECIHNOLOGICAL AGE 321-25
(rev. 4th ed. 2007) (explaining that experimental use allows the inventor to use the product for the purpose of
perfecting it or verifying its operability).
157. Id. at 325-31 (explaining that even where the court determines that infringement has occurred, the
court may still choose not to enforce the patent if the patentee has engaged in inequitable conduct).
158. Id. 331-37 (explaining that patent misuse is an affirmative defense that broadly describes any misuse of a
patent).
159. McCabe, supra note 38, at 21.
160. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 273(b), 282 (2006).
161. See id. § 282(2) (invalidity based on prior art); § 282(3) (invalidity based on failure to describe the
invention clearly and with sufficiency).
162. Evans Cooling Sys., Inc. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 125 F.3d 1448, 1452 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (stating that prior
public sale invalidated the patent).
163. KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 422 (2007) (combining prior art references to hold that
respondent's patent was invalid for obviousness).
164. Advanced Display Sys., Inc. v. Kent State Univ., 212 F.3d 1272, 1282 (Fed. Cir. 2000) ("Invalidity by
anticipation requires that the four comers of a single, prior art document describe every element of the
claimed invention, either expressly or inherently, such that a person of ordinary skill in the art could practice
the invention without undue experimentation.").
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and non-patentable subject matter.1 65 Section 273 previously only allowed a defendant to
argue prior use of a business method, an exceedingly narrow defense.1 66 But the AIA has
expanded prior use rights under § 273 to apply broadly to infringement for commercial
purposes.167
In comparison to U.S. law, Chinese patent law expands upon these defenses signifi-
candy.' 68 These defenses are often nebulously worded and provide vague limitations. 169
Most notably, a general provision of Chinese patent statutes proscribes patents that are
"contrary to the laws of the state or social morality or that [are] detrimental to public
interest." 170 This vague statutory defense permits courts to invalidate a patent ad hoc if
sharing the invention is determined "to promote the progress and innovation of science
and technology, and meet[s] the needs of the socialist modernization drive."' 7' Further-
ing this ambiguity is a catchall provision that gives the government the right to permit
exploitation of the invention "where public interest so requires." 172
Chinese statutes also expand on U.S. infringement defenses by implementing two "in-
nocent infringer" defenses. 173 The first provides a defense to an infringer who, before the
filing date, "has already manufactured identical products, used identical method[s,] or has
made necessary preparations for the manufacture or use and continues to manufacture the
products or use the method within the original scope."'174 Although there is a somewhat
analogous principle under U.S. trademark law,175 there is no such defense in U.S. patent
law unless the patent itself is invalid due to prior use.176
Second, under Chinese patent law an infringer may be innocent if he or she does not
know "that [the invention was] produced and sold without permission of the patentee." 177
The statute explicitly rules out damage awards, stating that the infringer "shall not be
liable for compensation provided that the legitimate source of the product can be
165. In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943, 949 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (en banc), affdsib nom., Bilski v. Kappos, 130 S. Ct.
3218 (2010).
166. 35 U.S.C. § 273(b) (2006) (stating that business method patents may not be enforced against certain
prior users).
167. See spra section fl(C)(l) (The America Invents Act Eliminates Three Major Differences between
China and American Patent Law that Previously Existed: Patent Priority, Prior Use Rights, and Best-Mode
Requirements).
168. McCabe, supra note 38, at 21.
169. Id. at 22.
170. 1984 Patent Law, spra note 62, art. 5; c. id. art. 45. ("[l]f a unit or individual believes that such grant
does not conform to the relevant provisions of this Law, it or he may request that the patent review board
declare the said patent right invalid.").
171. Id. art. 1; see generally KARLA C. SHIPPEY, A SHORT COURSE IN INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY RIGHTS; PROTECTING YOUR BRANDS, MARKS, COPYRIGHTS, PATENTS, DESIGNS, AND RE-
LATED RIGHTS WORLDWIDE (3d ed. 2009).
172. 1984 Patent Law, supra note 170, art. 49.
173. McCabe, supra note 38, at 23.
174. 1984 Patent Law, supra note 170, art. 69(2).
175. See Weiner King, Inc. v. Wiener King Corp., 615 F.2d 512, 523 (C.C.P.A. 1980) (holding that a busi-
ness may use its trademark in any geographic area except that of another entity holding a prior similar mark).
176. See Woodland Trust v. Flowertree Nursery, Inc., 148 F.3d 1368, 1370, 1373 (Fed. Cit. 1998) (holding
that a claim of prior use ineffective and stating that "in order to invalidate a patent based on prior knowledge
or use, that knowledge or use must have been available to the public").
177. 1984 Patent Law, supra note 170, art. 63.
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proved.' 78 The language does leave open the possibility for injunctive remedies.1 79 But
once again, the statutory language is not entirely clear as to the scope of the defense.
Interpreted broadly, infringers may claim ignorance in order to validate their actions.' 80
This type of attitude creates a risk of fraud, discouraging an infringer from investigating
its suppliers and encouraging willful blindness.' 8' Therefore, although China does not
employ stare decisis, and thus lacks any judicial defenses to infringement, China's statu-
tory defenses greatly outnumber the defenses available in the United States and provide
for a comparatively weaker IP system.
3. The Grace Period
China and the United States also differ in terms of the "grace period," a statutory ex-
ception in the United States that gives an inventor one year to freely publicize his or her
invention in the market without waiving any patent rights. 182 This is an exemption from
the general rule that a patent shall not be issued for an invention that is already publicly
available. 183 For example, a patent will not be issued in the United States for an invention
that was described in a printed publication anywhere in the world more than one year
before the application was filed in the country.' 84 Additionally, a patent will not be issued
in the United States for an invention that was in public use or on sale in the country more
than one year before the file date.' 8 5 The purpose of this one-year grace period is to allow
the inventor to attract investors, to tweak the invention, and to develop market strate-
gies. 186 The grace period starts when the inventor or a third party runs a printed publica-
tion of the invention, initiates public sale, or initiates public use.' 87
The implementation of the America Invents Act has altered grace periods only slightly,
although the real effect of the Act remains to be seen.' 88 After much Congressional de-
bate, the AIA grace period does not change the one-year time period.' 8 9 But the final
version of the AIA redefines what disclosures inventors can make. 190 Commentators note
that this section of the AIA is highly ambiguous, and inventors will have to wait and see
how courts will interpret the language. 191
Regardless of the future implications of the AIA, China differs starkly from the United
States because it lacks a grace period entirely for public use, public availability, or printed
178. Id.
179. Id.
180. See McCabe, spra note 38, at 24.
181. Id.
182. Corbett, supra note 144, at 719; see alsoJan Wolfe, What Effects Will the America Invents Act Have on U.S.
Patent Law?, CORP. COUNS. (Sept. 13, 2011), http://www.law.com/jsp/cc/PubArticleCC.jsp?id= 1202514170
593.
183. Wolfe, supra note 182.
184. Corbett, supra note 144, at 719.
185. Id.
186. Id.
187. Id.; SCHACiTrr & THOMAS, supra note 144, at 16.
188. Wolfe, snpra note 182.
189. Id.; Adam K. Sacharoff, U.S. Patent Reform in 2011: President Signs the America Invents Act, NAT'L L.
REv. (Oct. 24, 2011), http://www.natlawreview.com/aricle/us-patent-reform-201 1-president-signs-america-
invents-act.
190. Wolfe, supra note 182.
191. Id.
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publication. 192 In China, a patent will not be issued at all for an invention that has been
publicly used, publicly known, or disclosed in a publication in any country.193 As a result,
Chinese inventors must file for patents before they publish any information about their
inventions. 194 But there are three limited exceptions that provide an invenitor with a six-
month grace period. 195 Such a grace period is issued where an invention (1) was first
exhibited at a Chinese Government sponsored or recognized international exhibition, (2)
was first made public at an approved academic or technological meeting, or (3) was dis-
closed without the applicant's consent ("innocent infringer").196
For example, GlaxoSmithKline was forced to drop its claim that Chinese companies
were infringing on its patent of Avandia, a diabetes drug. 197 The claim failed because the
company had published information about the drug before filing for a patent.' 98 There-
fore, the novel elements essential to Avandia were available to the public, and Chinese
patent law considered them free to be appropriated for commercial use.199
4. Best Mode Requirement
Finally, the AIA modification of U.S. patent law has widened the differential gap be-
tween the best mode requirement in China and the United States.200 The AIA eliminated
the "best mode analysis" as a basis for invalidity. 201 Before this change, infringers could
assert "the defense that the patent [was] invalid because the patentee failed to disclose the
best mode of practicing the invention." 202 Although the best mode defense is no longer
available to invalidate patents, § 112 still requires a patentee to comply with the best mode
requirement through disclosure. 20 3 The new law simply states that a failure to do so does
not result in invalidation. 2°4 Language eliminating the best mode requirement was first
introduced in the Patent Reform Act of 2007 by Representative Mike Pence.205 Analysis
192. Lei Fang, Chinese Patent System and Its Enforcement, SUTHERLAND ASBILL & BRENNAN LLP, at 10
(Oct. 2005), http://www.sutherland.com/alertspubs/.
193. Id. ("Any invention that has been publicly known or used in China, or disclosed in a publication any-
where in the world is excluded from patent protection.").
194. Id. at 10-11.
195. 1984 Patent Law, supra note 170, art. 24.
196. Id.
197. Wu, snpra note 1, at 565-66; see also Jeffrey A. Andrews, Pfizer's Viagra Patent and the Promise of Patent
Protection in China, 28 Lov. L.A. INr'L & COMP. L. REv. 1, 18 (2006); Phelim Kyne & Leslie Chang, Glaxo
Gives Up Chinese Patent Amid Drug Makers' Challenge, WALL ST. J., Aug. 19, 2004, at B6 (describing how
GlaxoSmithKline abandoned a defense of its formulation for rosiglitazone because three Chinese makers of
generic drugs claimed that novel elements of Avandia had already been published in the public domain before
GlaxoSmithKline filed the patent).
198. Wu, supra note 1, at 565-66.
199. Id.
200. Id. at 566-67.
201. Zahra Hayat, Matthew Kreeger & Eric Walters, How the America Invents Act Will Change Patent Litiga-
tion, 18 WESTLAW J. INTELL. PROP., 1, at *1 (Nov. 16, 2011), available at 18 No. 15 WJINTPROP 1
(Westlaw).
202. Id.
203. Id.; 35 U.S.C. § 112 (2006).
204. Hayat, Kreeger & Walters, supra note 201, at *1.
205. See Patent Reform Act of 2007, H.R. 1908, 110th Cong. (2007).
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of this language provides the rationale for removing the best mode invalidity defense.206
Removal of this defense not only reduces the burden on courts, but also prevents an abu-
sive, overly litigious system that encourages defendants to attempt to invalidate patents.207
The danger of such a system is that it detracts from the infringement itself and costs
American inventors millions of dollars in legal fees.2 08
In contrast, the Chinese patent law's best mode requirements are much stricter, thereby
making it easier for a defendant to invalidate a patent on this basis.20 9 "Under Chinese
patent law, the applicant is required to disclose enough information to enable a person
skilled in the relevant field of technology to understand and exploit the invention."210
Specifically, the patentee must describe "in detail the optimally selected mode contem-
plated by the applicant for carrying out the invention or utility model."211 As a notewor-
thy example, SIPO invalidated Pfizer's Viagra patent because, instead of one ingredient, it
listed nine compounds as "particularly preferred individual compounds." 212 It was there-
fore not sufficiently descriptive under Chinese patent law. 213 Subsequently, the Patent
Reexamination Board (PRB) did overturn SIPO's decision and validate Pfizer's Viagra
patent.214 But the initial conflict represents an example of differences in best mode re-
quirements. After the AA's abolition of best mode invalidation is implemented, U.S. pat-
ent law will be further polarized from Chinese patent law, which more easily permits
patent invalidation based on failure to meet China's strict best mode requirements.
I. Future: The Need for a Fourth Amendment?
In the face of China's apparent progress, scholars still debate whether the latest amend-
ment to its patent law is enough. 215 Some contend that the Third Amendment falls short
of addressing China's full spectrum of patent problems, while some believe it adequately
resolves the prominent legal gaps left by the second amendment.216
206. See Wesley D. Markham, Is Best Mode the Worst? Dueling Arguments, Empirical Analysis, and Recommen-
dations for Reform, 51 IDEA 129, 157 (2011).
207. Id. at 157-58.
208. Id. at 133, 141-42, 153.
209. Wu, supra note 1, at 567.
210. Id.
211. Id. (citing Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhuanli Fa Shishi Xize (
[Implementing Regulations of the Patent Law of the People's Republic of China] (promulgated by the St.
Council of the People's Republic of China, June 15, 2001, 2d amend. Jan. 9, 2010) CCPIT PAT. & TRADE-
MARo L. OFF., at 7 (China), available at http://www.ccpit-patent.com.cn/references/Implementing-Regula-
tionsPatentLaw China.htm)).
212. See generally Lizhu Zheng, Invalidation Decision of Viagra Patent Revoked in China, 13 CASRIP NEWSL.
(Ctr. for Advanced Study & Research on Intellectual Prop., Seattle, WA), Spring/Summer 2006, available at
http://www.law.washington.edu/Casrip/Newsletter/default.aspx?year=2006&article=newsvl 3i2Zheng
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For example, Benjamin Bai, author of Wbat Multinational Companies Need to Know about
Patent Invalidation and Patent Litigation in China, optimistically comments that the Third
Amendment will resolve many of the previous deficiencies in Chinese patent law. 217 He
attempts to deflate the belief that Chinese courts favor domestic plaintiffs and encourages
foreign investors to familiarize themselves with China's IP system to utilize its patent laws
for protection.2 18 Other proponents claim that the new absolute novelty requirement will
relieve the concerns that international companies have regarding Chinese patents of their
ideas219 and, therefore, encourage foreign investment. 220
However, many call into question the adequacy of the Third Amendment because of
doubts that the new regulations will be enforced on a local level. 22 1 These scholars believe
that local governments fall victim to the pressures of an economy that depends on coun-
terfeiting or other types of infringement. 222 Counterfeiters provide indirect financial ben-
efits to their local economies by putting their profits back into the system-patronizing
restaurants, shops, and generally acting as local consumers. 223 Furthermore, local officials
are not only known for accepting bribes to look the other way, but sometimes participate
firsthand in the counterfeiting business. 224 Without a centralized government that en-
forces its patent laws at a local level, local Chinese governments will continue to operate as
they always have. 225
Proponents of a fourth amendment encourage the central government to take a stand in
several ways. One solution would be to re-route funding previously given to local govern-
ments directly into administrative agencies to ensure it is being used for enforcement.226
Additionally, a uniform SIPO training program could be implemented to remove the dis-
parities between different SIPO locales.2 27 Specific solutions such as these could help
wean local economies off counterfeiting and encourage creative development at the re-
gional level.2 2 8
217. Bai, Wang & Chen, supra note 124, at 72.
218. Id.
219. See Wu, supra note 1, at 584 ("Under the absolute novelty requirement, Chinese companies cannot file
for a drug patent if the drug has been patented elsewhere in the world.").
220. See Hepeng Jia, China Tightens IP Protection, But Concerns Linger, 27 NATURE BIOTECHNOLOGY 777,
787-88 (2009) (listing the absolute novelty requirement as one of the several improvements in Chinese patent
law).
221. Bronshtein, supra note 103, at 459 ("[]his central level authority is comprised mainly of legislative and
policy-making bodies, while actual implementation and enforcement of law occurs at the local level."); see
Maria Nelson et al., Counterfeit Pharmaceuticals: A Worldwide Problem, 96 TRADW R s REP. 1068, 1089 (2006)
("Enforcement efforts, particularly at the local level, are hampered by poor coordination among Chinese
Government ministries and agencies, [and] local protectionism and corruption .
222. Bronshtein, supra note 101, at 463.
223. Id. at 460.
224. Id. at 459-60; Evans, supra note 101, at 591 (stating that "many local officials directly profited from
piracy through kickbacks and bribes, while other high-ranking officers were involved firsthand in the produc-
tion of illegal goods and services").
225. Evans, supra note 99, at 591.
226. Wu, supra note 1, at 590-91.
227. Id. at 591.
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Thus, while the Third Amendment represents a significant step toward developing a
rigorous IP regime, it will remain largely ineffective unless local government autonomy
and corruption is dissolved. 229
IV. Conclusion
Considering China's tumultuous political and cultural background in the past century,
its IP regime has developed relatively rapidly. International trade concerns that China
will continue to infringe global IPRs should be tempered with the understanding that
China's IP system is one of the youngest in the world. China has taken several solid steps
toward rebuilding its IP laws. First, China has joined the WTO and several international
intellectual property organizations to show its dedication to implementing IPRs. Second,
China implemented its first patent law since the end of the Communist Regime in 1984.
Finally, China has amended this law twice in response to international complaints that its
laws were ineffective.
Despite these efforts, China's patent laws are still not sufficient. Although the Third
Amendment promises to make vast improvements to China's patent law, the enforcement
problem in China will persist as long as local government infrastructure is left untouched.
To address the enforcement problem, China's centralized government should assert regu-
lations by directing funding away from unstable local governments and toward administra-
tive agencies. The government should also ensure that SIPO is uniformly training officers
and enforcing regulations throughout the country. Although these changes cannot hap-
pen overnight, an initial recognition of the root of the problem is necessary to ensuring a
sustainable IP regime in China's future.
229. See id. at 589 (asserting that "Chinese patent law will continue to be ineffective as long as local govern-
ment corruption and protectionism exists").
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